Research and development (R&D) collaborations, common in high-tech industries, are challenging to manage due to technical and market risks as well as incentive problems. We investigate how control rights, options, payment terms and timing allow the innovator to capture maximum value from its R&D collaborations with a marketer. Our study reveals a counterintuitive result; the innovator may, under certain conditions, prefer to grant launch control rights or buy-out options to the marketer despite the fact that both terms restrict its downstream actions. We demonstrate that a menu of contracts is not necessary to address the adverse selection problem as the menu can be replicated by a single option contract. We show that timing, through renegotiation or delayed contracting, as well as the careful allocation of control rights and options can have a signicant inuence on the value of collaborative R&D. We provide recommendations on the optimal contract structure and timing based on two project characteristics, novelty of the R&D process and market-potential variability.
Introduction
Partnerships for research and development (R&D) projects are common to many researchintensive industries. Such collaborations can improve the value obtained from projects as dierent partners bring dierent skills to the partnership. For instance, in the pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology companies often hold innovative product ideas and patents, but lack the nancial and marketing capabilities to complete their projects successfully. Conversely, large pharmaceutical rms, who do have those capabilities, are on the lookout for patents they can in-license from biotechnology rms, both because their existing blockbuster patents are on the verge of expiry and due to declining internal R&D productivity (Pharma Deals Review 2011) . In the third quarter of 2014 alone, 125 agreements were signed with a total value exceeding $11 billion (Anderson 2014) .
Despite their enticing benets, R&D collaborations are fraught with uncertainties about the extent of their success. The presence of such uncertainties often results in complex contract structures, such as the inclusion of control rights and options (Lerner and Merges 1998; Elfenbein and Lerner 2003) . Both control rights and options allow their holder to react to new information that resolves some of the uncertainty concerning the project. Control rights refer to contract clauses that confer the right to make decisions unilaterally about whether and how to pursue further investment in the product. Options may include the right of one partner to buy out the other and take full ownership of the project at a predened price. Eective licensing contracts should also provide the appropriate incentives for the partners to invest in R&D and marketing. These investments have a signicant impact on the product value but are hard to specify and monitor as they involve highly complex tasks in an uncertain and shifting environment (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Hart and Moore 1999) .
Of similar importance is the innovator's decision on when to seek a partner: it impacts both the information available at the time of the agreement and the relative quality of the information available for the two parties involved. As uncertainties are resolved over time, postponing or revisiting the contracting decision may simplify the contract structure and improve performance.
In this paper, we study the eects of contract structure and timing on eorts for and success of R&D collaborations between two partners who combine dierent expertise: one partner (the innovator) specializes in R&D, whereas the other partner (the marketer) invests exclusively in marketing activities such as advertising and establishing wider distribution networks. This is a stylized form of a situation that often occurs in practice, where an innovator (she) has the technical know-how to create a product, and a marketer (he) brings the product to market. When the product appeals to a niche market and does not require vast distribution networks, an innovator may also be able to commercialize the product on her own, but at a cost disadvantage compared to the marketer, due to lack of experience in marketing. Our study focuses on contract clauses that are often found in R&D collaboration agreements; the right to decide whether to launch the product or terminate the agreement, as well as a buy-out or buy-back option. For each of these possible contract clauses, we nd the payment terms that will maximize the innovator's value. Next, we also study the optimal timing of the contracting decision given this complex contract structure. More specically, we investigate both contracting at the marketing stage and the case of upfront contracting with downstream renegotiation.
Existing literature has optimized the contractual payment termssuch as xed fees, royalties and option pricesfor dierent licensor and licensee characteristics and relationships, but always within a pre-specied contract structure. We take an overarching view of the licensing phenomenon and attempt to consolidate and build on existing knowledge by jointly optimizing the licensing contract structure and parameters in a setting with collaborative eorts and a model of the R&D process reecting the heterogeneity of R&D projects. We investigate how an innovator should optimize the payment terms, the allocation of control rights and options and the timing of the contracting decision to capture maximum value from the collaboration with the marketer. We identify two factors which should guide both the choice of the contract structure and the timing of the licensing decision: the type of R&D process and the variability in the product's market potential.
The output of the R&D process is the extent to which a product is successful, ranging from failure to generate a viable product as the worst-case scenario, to the creation of a mediocre product (low market-potential outcome) or a blockbuster product (high market-potential outcome). We dene market-potential variability as the gap between the values of the low and high market-potential outcomes. The size of this gap increases with consumers' sensitivity to product attributes. The higher the sensitivity, the higher the penalty for not meeting expectations on all product attributes. With respect to the type of the R&D process, we distinguish between novel and incremental processes. When the R&D process is novel, such as when a company aims to nd a new mechanism of action to target a disease, additional R&D eorts increase the chance of both the low and high market-potential outcomes while reducing the chance of failure. In the example above, these R&D eort could encompass target identication, lead discovery and optimization as well as the design of appropriate clinical trials. When the R&D is incremental, e.g., R&D eorts are focused on modifying existing active compounds that work through a known physiological pathway to identify a safer and more eective drug or new disease indications, additional eorts in R&D increase the probability of a high market-potential outcome while reducing the probability of the low market-potential outcome. Thus in the former case, R&D eort is more eective at raising the overall probability of success than in the latter.
We nd that both the type of the R&D process and the variability of the market-potential determine which type of control rights and options allow the innovator to extract maximum value from an innovation while partnering with a marketer. We now describe some examples of each quadrant in Table 1. 1 In 2011, Genentech and FORMA Therapeutics signed an agreement aiming to nd a new mechanism of action to 1 Note that some combinations of product characteristics are more likely to occur. For instance, one might expect that novel R&D is more frequently associated with high market-potential variability (bottom right quadrant) and incremental research with low market-potential variability (top left quadrant). starve tumors, with the stated ambition to address intractable targets. In this project, the R&D process entails the identication of suitable molecules that would attach to cancer cells and the subsequent optimization of these molecules while minimizing safety concerns. At the same time, the number of potential targets adds uncertainty about which of them might be successfully addressed and makes market potential more dicult to predict. Together, these factors indicate a novel project with high market-potential variability. The agreement contained a buy-out option for Genentech, allowing it to acquire all rights to the program via a xed payment.
R&D Process
In the same year, Sam Amer and Ventrus Biosciences signed an agreement to collaborate on the investigation of the ecacy of a known mechanism of action, by adapting drug delivery to and designing clinical tests for an as yet o-label indication with a well-dened market, hemorrhoidsan incremental innovation with low market-potential variability. The royalty rate was renegotiated down at a later date.
Novartis and Paratek Pharmaceuticals' 2009 agreement described drug candidate PTK0796 as derived from another class of antibiotics. Thus, R&D eorts attempt to nd the most promising compound in that class that will be safer and more eective than those currently on the market. Despite the incremental nature of the R&D process, antibiotics face uncertainty about whether the targeted bacteria will develop resistance to existing/competing antibiotics. This leads to high market-potential variability. 
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R&D process type and market-potential variability aect the optimal contract choice because these two project characteristics interact with the contract structure and payment terms. The innovator exploits these interactions to manage three distinct eciency losses:
2 We acknowledge that other factors also play a role in the contracting decision which may lead to a dierent contract structure.
suboptimal R&D eort, suboptimal marketing eort, and launch by the innovator with higher marketing costs (launch ineciency). As we will demonstrate, a novel project with low market-potential variability is mainly susceptible to launch and marketing eort inefciencies. This makes contracts with innovator launch control attractive as the marketer always launches the product and marketing eorts are not distorted by royalties. An incremental project with high market-potential variability is susceptible to R&D eort ineciency.
Marketer launch control creates incentives for R&D eort by placing a high prize on the high market-potential outcome. When a project is incremental and has low-market potential variability it is susceptible to all three contract ineciencies. In such cases, it helps to either delay contracting until more information is available or to renegotiate an upfront contract to avoid ineciencies. Lastly, a buy-out contract balances eects of all ineciencies and is suitable for all other R&D projects.
Literature Review
We draw on literature from three dierent areas: the analysis of incomplete contracts in the economics literature, the application of incomplete contracts to collaborative R&D, and nally, the empirical analysis of R&D contracts found in the management literature.
We refer to Tirole (1999) for an overview of the state of incomplete contracting research, i.e., contracts cannot contain provisions for all possible future scenarios. He contrasts incomplete and complete contracting, and cautions the researcher about the inherent assumptions of incomplete contracting. Our work is related to a stream of literature devoted to the holdup problem. One approach considers the buyer's and seller's ecient investment and delivery of a good or service. In their model, Hart and Moore (1988) show that, if the court cannot observe why delivery did not take place, the rst-best investment levels cannot be achieved except under some restrictive assumptions. Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) , however, show that if the buyer and the seller can sign an option contract giving the buyer the right, but not the obligation to deliver the goods, the rst-best investment levels can be achieved. Subsequent articles have shown that the ability of a contract to deliver rst-best eciency may depend, among other things, on the court mechanism used to enforce the contract (Edlin and Reichelstein 1996) , the nature of the buyer's and the seller's investment (Che and Hausch 1999) , risk-aversion (Chung 1991; Holden 1999 ) and the timing of the investments (Smirnov and Wait 2004) . Grossman and Hart (1986) introduce the notion of control rights as part of a contract, separately from ownership or allocation of returns. When uncontractible elements lead to distortions, an adequate allocation of control rights can reduce the ineciencies. In Aghion and Bolton (1992) , rst-best eciency can be achieved through the appropriate allocation of control rights, under certain conditions. Hellmann (1998) studies a venture capital model which shows that an entrepreneur may be willing to concede favorable control terms to the venture capitalist in order to increase his nancial reward. We nd similar results in a dierent setting.
The holdup problem has also been investigated in the area of contracting for collaborative investment or research. In a seminal paper on the subject, Aghion and Tirole (1994) , posit that careful allocation of ownership and control rights is required in order to create the correct incentives for the researcher. Taking this problem forward, many papers have studied dierent issues arising in R&D collaboration by changing the contracting terms or the information structure of the game. Dechenaux et al. (2009) contrast the impact of milestones and royalties on research eort, risk sharing and shelving of projects. Bhaskaran and Krishnan (2009) emphasize the collaborative aspect of new product development (NPD) and propose dierent mechanisms to share costs or development eort, beyond the incentive effects of milestone and royalty contracts. They nd that either cost, eort or no sharing at all can be optimal under dierent circumstances. Savva and Scholtes (2013) show that research partnerships governed by milestone and royalty contracts lead to inecient outcomes and describe a contract with opt-out options for either party which restores eciency. Bhattacharya et al. (2014) similarly nd that option contracts can create the correct incentives for partners and achieve risk-sharing. Finally, Xiao and Xu (2012) study the traditional contract structure, but allow for renegotiation of the contract terms. This improves incentives across NPD stages but also increases the cost to the licensee of inducing the innovator to reveal her true value. The main dierence with the models studied above is that our setting combines collaborative eorts by both parties under technical uncertainty and market-potential variability with a novel model of R&D eort impact.
There is a sizable stream of empirical literature studying R&D licensing contracts conrming that the allocation of control rights is of crucial importance in practice and that the assignment of control rights is closely linked to the nancial resources of the R&D rm (Lerner and Merges 1998) and the relative nancial and product market strengths of the alliance partners (Elfenbein and Lerner 2003) . In their conclusion, Lerner and Merges (1998) mention that the relationship between the structure of compensation and the allocation of control rights remains to be addressed. Lerner and Malmendier (2010) conrm empirically that when research eort is non-contractible, termination options with (partial) allocation of property rights to the nancing entity encourages the innovator to invest adequately in research.
Interest in the timing decision for collaboration on R&D has been rising both in practice and in the academic world. In their analysis of the current state of the pharmaceutical industry Kalamas and Pinkus (2003) suggest that the industry would benet from starting collaborations earlier than it currently does and that better nancial terms for small biotechnology rms at earlier stages would motivate biotechnology rms to partner earlier.
This would also allow the pharmaceutical partner to avoid more intense competition for late stage licensing opportunities. The literature focuses on rm level and industry level characteristics such as the background of the CEO, prior collaboration experience of the innovator, R&D intensity of the innovator, introduction of new regulation and patent application and approval as determinants of the timing of the collaboration (Katila and Mang 2003, Gans et al. 2008) . In contrast to these studies, our model identies project level characteristics that have an impact on the timing of an agreement between partners. Thus our paper points to new drivers of licensing contract timing, structure and payment terms, such as the impact of R&D process type and market-potential variability, that would be interesting to consider in future empirical work.
R&D Collaboration Model
In this section we dene the model characteristics and formulate and solve the rst-best project execution (i.e., one from a central planner's perspective).
Model Description
Our model consists of an innovator and a marketer. The innovator owns the intellectual property rights to an innovation and desires to contract with a marketer to bring her innovation to market. The innovator can continue to perform R&D activities to improve the characteristics of the innovation. The result of this R&D process is represented in stylized form as three possible outcomes. First, if the technical features do not exceed a minimum threshold, the product cannot be launched. Second, the product could have low marketpotential. Third, the product could have high market-potential. Thus, our model allows us to go beyond a binary outcome of failure or success. Dierent market-potential values could result from the specic combination of technical features that may aect the product's sales prospects, for instance the ecacy and side eects of a new drug, or the weight, dimension and battery life for electronics. We express market-potential as a scalar measure that summarizes the base sales prospects of the product. Product sales, however, not only depend on the market-potential, but also on how successfully the product is marketed. The innovator has the necessary know-how to complete R&D, but she may lack the experience and the resources for a successful product launch. The marketer, on the other hand, has expertise in new product management and desires to contract with the innovator to add innovative products to his product portfolio.
R&D collaboration contracts can contain the following commonly found payment terms: a contract signature fee, a milestone payment at successful completion of the research phase, and a royalty percentage on the sales. Most R&D collaboration contracts will also specify non-monetary clauses that determine the rights and obligations of both parties within the relationship. We focus on the right (a) of both parties to choose whether to launch the product, (b) for the marketer to buy out the innovator from the contract and (c) for the innovator to buy back the product. The timeline of the project and the interaction between the innovator and the marketer is given in Figure 1 . We have created a separate timeline for dierent timing scenarios:
upfront contracting, upfront contracting with renegotiation, and delayed contracting. At time t = 1, the innovator negotiates and signs a contract with the marketer or decides to delay contracting until t = 4. The contract species the payments from the marketer to the innovator (upfront payment s, milestone payment l, and royalty rate r) and can also include clauses allocating control rights pertaining to product launch, or buy-out and buy-back options. The innovator decides on her optimal R&D eort level, e, and incurs a corresponding cost, ce 2 /2, at t = 2. This inuences the R&D outcome of the product, which is observed at t = 3. The outcome can be failure (insucient for launch), low or high market-potential (α 0 , α L and α H respectively). The R&D eort inuences the likelihood of the three outcomes (π i (e) = p i + γ i e, i ∈ {0, L, H}) and has a positive eect on expected market-potential. At t = 4, one of three events can take place. If an upfront contract was signed, either a launch decision has to be taken or the contract can be renegotiated.
If the decision was to delay at time t = 1, contract negotiation takes place for technically successful products. After the product is launched, the marketer, or possibly the innovator if the marketer chooses not to launch when the market-potential outcome is low, decides on the appropriate marketing eort at t = 5 (µ iM for the marketer or µ LI for the innovator) and incurs the cost of eort (k j µ 2 ij /2, j ∈ {M, I}). Sales revenues at t = 6 are a function of market-potential and marketing eort (v(α i , µ ij ) = α i µ ij ). We assume that the innovator and marketer are rational, risk-neutral agents who choose their eort levels to maximize respective individual prot.
Central to the contracting problem is the assumption that the innovator's and marketer's eort levels are unobservable, and thus cannot be meaningfully written into a contract.
While it would be possible to specify the amount of resources to be invested, we argue that it is unrealistic to dene R&D or marketing input in terms of resources spent, because the quality of the eort inuences the impact of invested resources. Because the eort level of the innovator and marketer are both unobservable, we deal with a two-sided moral hazard problem and the contract will have to oer incentives to both parties to invest an appropriate level of eort.
We summarize our notation in Table 2 and provide an explanation below. To guarantee
Decisions Parameters Marketer's marketing eort cost factor * i ∈ {0, H, L} indicates R&D outcomes (market-potential) and j ∈ {I, M } indicates player Table 2 : Notation used in models concavity of the objective function, we made the following assumptions: the probabilities of the three scenarios of market-potential are linear in R&D eort, sales revenue is linear in marketing eort, and the cost of research and marketing is quadratic in eort. We assume that blockbuster products can only be successfully marketed by the marketer, with a cost factor k M , whereas the innovator can potentially market a low market-potential product herself, with a cost factor k I , and k I > k M . To reduce notation, we set c = 1, p H = 0 and write π 0 (e) = 1−π L (e)−π H (e), with γ H = 1 (wlog). This allows us to drop the subscript for γ in the probability functions and write π L = p L +γe and π H = e. We allow γ ∈ [γ, γ] ∈ [−1, 1].
The limits γ and γ are chosen to ensure that π i remains a valid probability distribution (the limits will be explicitly calculated after the model exposition).
3 3 Schuett (2012) also adopts a model where eort inuences types of outcomes for a rm licensing out a
Another important factor to consider is the nature of the R&D process under consideration: dierent projects are aected dierently by the R&D eort expended on them. In particular, for a novel R&D process, research eort increases the probability of being successful (reduces π 0 ), more than it distinguishes between high and low market-potential outcomes.
This implies a γ close to 1. In the pharmaceutical industry, this could correspond to a project aimed at the discovery of an entirely new mechanism of action against a particular disease.
Eorts of the company in trying to develop this new mechanism of action may reduce the chance of failure but increase the probability of both high and low market-potential outcomes to a similar degree. At the other extreme, we have research that is incremental in nature and alters features of an existing product or applies a known technology to a new market. In that case, the R&D eort does not so much increase the probability of success as aect the relative probabilities of market-potential outcomes (increases π H mostly at the expense of π L ). This corresponds to γ close to -1. We can illustrate this category with the development of a xed-dose or single-tablet regimen of an existing drug with a proven mechanism of action where higher R&D eort would improve compliance and hence adoption, while technical success is relatively assured regardless of the R&D eort. By varying the parameter γ from −1 to 1, we allow for intermediate scenarios of R&D eort impact.
Another important assumption is that the achieved market-potential (upon observation of technical success) is non-veriable, i.e., cannot be be contracted upon.
This implies
that (a) the milestone payment cannot vary depending on the market-potential and (b) the milestone payment is conditioned on the launch. Similar assumptions for the denition of a milestone payment are made in Savva and Scholtes (2013) and Bhattacharya et al. (2014) . This is in line with management practice, where future market-potential is very hard to contract upon.
Social Optimum
We determine the socially optimal execution (rst-best execution) of the collaboration, which will serve as a benchmark for the performance of a contractual relationship. In this case, the decision rights are given to a central planner who determines the research and marketing patent for two elds of use. In the absence of overlap between elds of use, licensees act as monopolies. With overlap, licensees compete, which reduces value. Higher eort reduces the chance of overlap. In contrast, our model considers highlow outcomes along with a failure outcome and distinguishes between dierent types of R&D processes. 4 While contracts often have nancial terms that vary with the level of sales achieved, such as sales milestones, royalties or tiered royalties, these payments depend on the actual sales realized, not the underlying market-potential. In other words, whether a given sales level has been reached with lower market-potential and high eort or higher market-potential but lower eort cannot be veried. Therefore, one cannot contract upon market-potential directly.
eorts. The following formulation optimizes the expected total project value V SOC :
resulting in:
The central planner always assigns the task of marketing the product to the marketer as he has a lower marketing eort cost. The marketing eort decision can be separated from the R&D eort decision as the optimal marketing eort depends only on the product's realized market-potential and not on the R&D eort preceding it. The optimal R&D eort, e SOC , depends on the marketing eort, as the latter determines the sales revenue under each outcome.
5 Self-interested innovators and marketers, however, deviate from socially optimal eort levels and the contract must align incentives to achieve maximum value.
We develop a series of models with dierent contract structures, terms and timings in the remainder of the paper (please refer to Figure 1 for an overview of the dierent models covered). In these models, we take the perspective of the innovator who owns the invention.
We therefore use the terms optimum/optimal to refer to the innovator's payo and the terms social optimum/socially optimal as they were used in this subsection.
Upfront Contracting
Innovators often contract with the marketer before the R&D eort has been fully completed.
In that case, a signicant portion of the technical and commercial risk is still remaining. The contract structure should therefore include clauses that allow the partnership to react to the resolution of the uncertainties, such as through the allocation of launch control or options.
For analytical tractability we start out by limiting our contracts to two payment terms.
The milestone contract contains an upfront payment and a milestone payment at product launch. The royalty contract contains an upfront payment and a percentage royalty on product sales. These simple contracts allow us to focus on the underlying interactions between payment terms and structural elements. Milestone payments aect the desirability of launch from the marketer's perspective which makes launch control an eective value creation mechanism. Conversely, royalties create an eciency loss by distorting the marketer's eort and 5 The denition of e SOC allows us to determine γ = min{γ * , 1}, with γ
options can be used to address this problem. We rst analyze control rights paired with milestone contracts, then turn to options paired with royalty contracts. We also conrm numerically that our results hold for contracts that include all three payment terms.
Launch Control
First, we focus on the allocation of the right to decide whether or not to launch the product to either the innovator or the marketer. Intuitively, we can immediately discern that the innovator's and the marketer's decisions will not always be aligned: the innovator is always eager to launch, as she no longer bears any costs once her part of the development phase is completed, whereas the marketer will only want to launch if the product will be suciently protable to cover the contractual payments to the innovator.
Launch control is particularly relevant in milestone payment contracts, in which the marketer agrees to pay the innovator an upfront payment s and a milestone payment l.
Milestone contracts oer the advantage of not distorting the eort level of the marketer: a milestone payment is constant regardless of the marketer's eort whereas under a royalty rate, an increase in the marketer's eort increases the royalty payments he has to make. A high milestone payment, however, may turn a marginally protable invention into a loss to the marketer, and the marketer and the innovator may disagree on launching the invention.
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Thus we focus on milestone payment contracts with rst the innovator and then the marketer holding the launch control rights.
Innovator Launch Control
As mentioned earlier, the innovator always benets from launch as she earns a milestone payment l and bears no further cost. The innovator's optimization problem, taking into account the marketer's incentive and participation constraints, is given by:
e = (γ + 1)l
Eq (6) reects the marketer's optimization problem for the marketing eort. Eq (7) determines the innovator's optimal R&D eort. Finally, Eq (8) ensures that the marketer obtains his reservation utility, which is set to zero.
Theorem 1 A milestone contract with innovator launch control achieves the social optimum if and only if p L = 0 and γ ≥ 0. In that case, the optimal contract is (s, l) = 0,
. If p L > 0, the social optimum is not achieved and the optimal contract is
All proofs are in the Appendix. This theorem tells us that us that milestone payments may not be eective for every R&D process type. When γ = −1, a milestone contract fails to induce any R&D eort at all; because the milestone payment does not depend on the achieved market-potential and eort does not increase the chances of technical success, the innovator has no incentive to expend any eort. As γ varies from −1 to 1, ceteris paribus, the innovator's value from milestone contracts will increase, as milestone payments will become increasingly eective at creating an incentive for the innovator, and might even be able to achieve social optimum under the condition listed in Theorem 1.
Marketer Launch Control
Allocating launch control to the marketer creates a new constraint for the innovator: once the market-potential is revealed, the marketer will only want to launch if his prot, net of the milestone payment to the innovator, is positive. Therefore, if the innovator designs the contract to induce the marketer to launch the product in both market-potential outcomes (δ = 1), the milestone payment is bounded by the prot under the low market-potential outcome, and the innovator's incentive to invest in research will be correspondingly low. If the milestone payment exceeds the net prot under the low market-potential outcome, the marketer will prefer not to launch the low market-potential product (δ = 0) and only launch the high market-potential product. We call such a contract an exclusion contract. If the marketer refuses to launch the product, the innovator regains all rights to the innovation and can launch the product on her own. We modify the innovator's optimization problem accordingly.
Theorem 2 There exists aγ ∈ [−1, 1] such that for all γ ≥γ the optimal contract is
) with the project being launched by the marketer under both market-potential outcomes, whereas for all γ <γ, an exclusion contract (s, l) = (0,
Theorem 2 shows that it may not always be optimal for the innovator to aim for both market-potential outcomes to be launched by the marketer, despite the marketer having a lower cost of marketing eort. To guarantee the marketer's launch of the low marketpotential product, the milestone payment is restricted by his prot in that scenario. As the milestone payment l is constant and does not reect the higher value obtained in case of a high market-potential outcome, the innovator has a relatively low incentive to invest in R&D to achieve a high market-potential outcome. This constraint on l is particularly restrictive if the market-potential variability is large. The problem is compounded for low γ as the R&D eort increases the probability of a high market-potential outcome at the expense of the low market-potential outcome, and the ideal R&D eort can only be induced by giving strong incentives linked to the high market-potential outcome. In such cases, it might be more protable for the innovator to create a strong incentive to invest in research by setting the milestone payment such that the marketer will only launch the high market-potential outcome.
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Intuitively, we expect that giving away control to the marketer should not be in the innovator's interest as it adds a constraint to her decision problem. Furthermore, as the marketer enjoys a cost advantage in marketing eort, an exclusion contract that forces the innovator to launch the low market-potential outcome herself is inecient, and innovator launch control would seem more appropriate. Nonetheless, we nd that it can be in the innovator's interest to yield control over the launch decision to the marketer when an exclusion contract is optimal. We formally characterize the optimal contract in the following theorem.
7 The case of the exclusion contract, by achieving a high R&D eort when γ < 0, allows us to determine
Theorem 3 Ifγ > −1, then aγ ≤γ exists such that for all γ ≤γ an exclusion contract is more protable than the optimal value from a milestone contract with innovator launch control.
Ceding control is unattractive for γ ≥γ, when the optimal contract under marketer launch control is to launch both outcomes: the launch decision remains the same, but a constraint on the milestone payment is added. However, if a region exists in which the exclusion contract is optimal, i.e.,γ > −1, there will be a region such that ceding launch control is optimal for −1 ≤ γ ≤γ ≤γ.
The implications of Theorem 3 may be more apparent when we investigate Figure 2 . In general, which contract is preferred depends on trade-os made between various ineciencies caused by each contract. First, note that exclusion contracts create a launch ineciency for low market-potential products because the product is launched by the innovator who is at a cost disadvantage when it comes to exerting marketing eort. This launch ineciency is more pronounced when α L is high, i.e. variability is low. When this is the case, it is favorable to have innovator launch control which avoids the launch ineciency and ensures that the product is always launched by the marketer who has a cost advantage. Second, the fact that the marketer only launches the high market-potential product means that the innovator can charge a very high milestone payment when signing an exclusion contract.
This high milestone payment, in turn, creates incentives for the innovator to increase the probability of the high market-potential outcome by increasing her R&D eort. When γ is low, increased R&D eort also translates into a lower chance of suering from the launch ineciency, further increasing the attractiveness of the exclusion contract. Combining these two eects, we can see that lower γ and higher variability make exclusion contracts attractive while higher γ and lower variability make innovator launch control more attractive. In summary, while an exclusion contract may substantially reduce the prot under the low market-potential outcome, it allows a high milestone payment which creates an incentive for higher R&D eort. As the innovator cannot credibly commit to not launching once the market-potential has been revealed to be low, she creates commitment by ceding launch control to the marketer.
Options
Another way to govern the launch of a product is to grant buy-out or buy-back options.
Under royalty contracts, options rather than control rights become valuable tools because the launch decision will be unanimous. Royalty contracts oer two advantages: they oer the innovator an incentive that is directly proportional to the value created by the R&D eort and 
they do not distort the launch decision. In our model without xed costs related to product launch, there is no distortion of the launch decision and the low and high market-potential outcomes are both protable to the marketer. Therefore, we do not dierentiate between innovator and marketer launch control. However, royalties present the major drawback of distorting marketer eort, destroying a fraction of the project's realized value. This also means that royalties are most damaging for high market-potential realizations. This quandary makes buy-out options attractive.
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A buy-out option can be benecial if the innovator can set a high strike price that the marketer wishes to exercise in the high market-potential outcome, without preventing him from launching the product under the low market-potential outcome. We nd that buyback options on their own are never optimal as an exclusion contract can be used to ensure innovator launch of the low market-potential outcome. Finally, it is possible to combine buyout and buy-back options in one contract. This contract, however, will simplify to either the buy-out or the exclusion contract, depending on which contract structure is optimal.
Buy-Out Option
A contract can oer a buy-out option to the marketer by specifying the strike price of the option that he has to pay to the innovator, and the time at which it can be exercised. In our timeline, the option expiry is logically set after the R&D outcome is revealed but before the launch decision is taken. As a benchmark, we will rst determine the optimal royalty rate without a buy-out option, and then discuss the impact of a buy-out option.
Optimal royalty rate without buy-out option A simple royalty contract without a 8 Buy-out option would be redundant in combination with a milestone contract in which the buy-out price would be equal to the milestone payment.
buy-out option leads to the following optimization problem.
Proposition 1 If p L = 0, then the optimal royalty rate is a constant r * = 1/3. If p L > 0, then the optimal royalty rate drops below 1/3.
The optimal royalty rate balances the detrimental eect on value due to the reduced marketing eort with the increase in probability of launch achieved by giving an incentive to the innovator to invest in R&D eort. A higher p L decreases the optimal royalty rate because the need for R&D eort is less and the detrimental impact on value after launch gains in importance.
Buy-out option and royalty rate The buy-out clause species a price B at which the marketer can buy out the innovator after the R&D outcome has been revealed. If the marketer exercises the buy-out clause, he no longer pays the royalty on the product sales, and he will invest the socially optimal amount of marketing eort because he becomes the sole owner of the product. Clearly, this is most valuable if the option is exercised for the high market-potential outcome, as the losses from the distortion due to the royalty rate are largest. The contract should be structured such that it creates discrimination between the low and high market-potential outcomes without requiring external enforcement. This is achieved by setting the buy-out price B such that:
The innovator prefers the highest possible exercise price and sets B = r(2 − r)α 2 H /(2k M ), and the marketer will not exercise the buy-out option under the low market-potential outcome. Thus we formulate the innovator's optimization problem as follows: 9 max s≥0,0≤r≤1ê
9 The denition ofμ HM and B = r(2−r)α
Theorem 4 A royalty contract with buy-out option yields a higher expected value to the innovator than a royalty contract without buy-out option. Furthermore, the royalty rate of a buy-out contract exceeds the royalty rate of a royalty contract.
This theorem shows that buy-out options are relevant in the presence of royalties as they allow the innovator to increase the royalty rate with positive eects on R&D eort yet limits the adverse eect of royalties to the low market-potential outcome. While it is generally accepted that holding an option usually creates value, the theorem demonstrates that giving away an option is also valuable when it creates a credible commitment to higher R&D eort.
Our prior analysis revealed that it could be optimal to assign launch control rights to the marketer in order to credibly signal high R&D eort. This came at the cost of the innovator having to launch the low market-potential products, despite her cost disadvantage. A buyout contract oers a solution to the launch ineciency: the increased royalty rate does not prevent launch of the low market-potential outcome but acts as a motivation for the marketer to exercise the buy-out option under the high market-potential outcome. Thus the incentive to invest in research is still strong as the innovator hopes to achieve the higher prize of the buy-out option, without forcing launch ineciency. Whether this creates a gain over the exclusion contract depends on the comparison of two ineciencies: namely, the higher marketing cost of the innovator versus the negative impact of the royalty rate on the marketer's eort. As the comparison between milestone contracts with innovator launch control and royalty contracts with buy-out options is inconclusive, we resort to numerical methods to determine which type of contract is optimal for dierent problem paremeters.
Buy-Back Option
In a setting where the innovator has the option to buy back her product with no option assigned to the marketer, we nd that exclusion contracts render contracts with buy-back options suboptimal. By setting a high enough milestone, the exclusion contract allows the innovator to take back its product for free while also avoiding sales-distorting royalties. The result regarding two-way options below will make this outcome more apparent.
Two-Way Option
Buy-out and buy-back options can be included in a single contract where the two parties potentially exercise dierent options in dierent scenarios. However, we nd that such a contract is equivalent to either a buy-out option or an exclusion contract.
Theorem 5 In a two-way option contract, the innovator either sets an arbitrarily high buyback price making it suboptimal to ever exercise the buy-back option, or sets r = 1, the buy-back strike price to zero and the buy-out strike price to α 2 H /(2k M ).
In the rst case of Theorem 5, the innovator never exercises the buy-back option which makes the two-way option equivalent to a buy-out option. In the latter case, a two-way option contract allows an option to be exercised in both market-potential outcomes. This, in turn, allows the innovator to set royalties to r = 1 without harming marketing eorts because royalties will always be avoided due to the exercised options. As royalties are set to 1, the product is worthless in the hands of the marketer, and he is willing to allow the innovator to buy" the product back for free. With r = 1, the buy-out strike price r(2 − r)α
, which makes the contract equivalent to an exclusion contract. Figure 3 compares the values of three dierent contracts. The optimal contract choice depends on the tradeos between the launch, marketing and research ineciencies created by each contract structure. For novel projects (high γ) and/or low market-potential variability (high α L ), launch and marketing ineciencies are costly and a milestone contract with innovator launch control is preferable. For incremental products (low γ), research ineciencies can only be resolved with exclusion contracts or buy-out contracts. If launch ineciencies are of concern (high α L ), this is best addressed through buy-out contracts. Otherwise, exclusion contracts are preferred as they generate the strongest research incentive.
Full Contracts: Upfront and Milestone Payments and Royalties
Our analysis so far has focused on contracts with either milestone payments or royalties. Naturally, designing contracts with both elements may lead to higher contract values. However, this is not always the case as shown by Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 1. Milestone contracts without a royalty rate are optimal (a) if the milestone contract with innovator launch control achieves social optimum or (b) if an exclusion contract is optimal.
2. It is optimal to set l = 0 when γ = −1. 
It is clear from Figure 4 that the results for full contracts display a very similar pattern of contract structure choices as the milestone-only or royalty-only contracts. The actual values taken on by the payment terms, however, are inuenced both by the optimal contract structure and the choice to allow full contracts. Our results conrm the intuition that the optimal royalty rate is much higher when a buy-out contract is optimal than for other contract structures.
Renegotiation
The allocation and exercise of control rights and options is not the only way to react to new information: as uncertainties are resolved over time, the two parties may choose to renegotiate the initial contract. While Plambeck and Taylor (2007) suggest that renegotiation is often excluded by papers in operations management on the grounds that it is prohibitively costly, the authors show that renegotiation can be optimal. So far in our paper, we have implicitly assumed that renegotiation is prohibitively costly. In this section, we explore the cases when renegotiation is costless or moderately costly. We focus most of our eorts on the less explored intermediate cost case where renegotiation is neither prohibitively costly nor costless.
If renegotiation is costless, Hart and Moore (1988) and Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) show that renegotiation can be benecial and even help achieve the rst-best outcome under certain conditions. In our model, renegotiation could be instigated once new information becomes available, i.e., the R&D outcome is revealed, but before the contract terms are executed and the marketer's eort level is decided. Renegotiation occurs whenever there are eciency gains to be realized because the initial contract distorts eort or distorts launch decisions and a new contract can be written that leaves both parties better o. In line with Hart and Moore (1988) , the innovator will invest the optimal R&D eort level if she is the recipient of all the ex-post surplus. This can be achieved by writing an exclusion contract with a milestone payment l = α 2 H /(2k M ) that the innovator will subsequently oer to negotiate down to l = α 2 L /(2k M ) whenever the market-potential is low. This gives the innovator the full surplus regardless of the market-potential without distorting the marketer's eort level.
Adding renegotiation costs clearly reduces the attractiveness of renegotiation and if the cost of renegotiation exceeds the benets achieved by renegotiation, no Pareto-improving renegotiation can take place. Various papers acknowledge that renegotiation is neither costless nor prohibitively costly (e.g. Garleanu and Zwiebel 2009) . We model the cost of renegotiation as a xed cost, F > 0, that is entirely borne by the principal, the innovator, at the time of renegotiation and study the previously discussed contract types in turn.
Milestone Contracts As milestone contracts do not lead to distortion of marketing eort, the only benet from renegotiation is when the launch decision is distorted and we can focus exclusively on exclusion contracts. The innovator may nd it benecial to renegotiate an exclusion contract in case of a low market-potential outcome. Inserting the value of the future renegotiation into the innovator's initial problem formulation, this leads to the following optimization problem:
), the exclusion contract will be renegotiated in the low market-potential outcome. The optimal contract terms are {s, l} = {0,
}, and lead to the following optimal R&D eort and contract value:
Buy-Out Option Contract In an option contract, eciency gains can be achieved by eliminating the eort-distorting royalty rate in the low market-potential outcome. The innovator's optimization problem becomes:
Renegotiation is only ex-post rational when the renegotiation cost is F ≤ α 2 L r 2 2k M . As we cannot write a closed form expression for the optimal royalty rate in the absence of renegotiation, we focus instead on the intuition behind the optimal buy-out contract in the presence of costly renegotiation. Assume that without renegotiation, the optimal royalty rate is r 1 (as calculated in section 4.2.1). Two cases may occur: F ≤
In the rst case, renegotiation is protable, whereas in the second it is not. Let us take the rst case, in which renegotiation occurs. If the buy-out contract induces renegotiation, then the minimum amount of distortion of the R&D eort is trivially achieved when the royalty rate is set to r = 1. In the high market-potential outcome, the marketer exercises his buy-out option priced at B = α 2 H /(2k M ), and in the low market-potential outcome, renegotiation achieves a net payo to the innovator of α 2 L /(2k M ) − F . Note that these are exactly the same payos as in the milestone contract with marketer launch and renegotiation. In the second case, renegotiation is not ex-post optimal, and the optimal royalty rate is r * = r 1 .
The contract value is the same as in the buy-out contract without renegotiation studied in section 4.2.1. A comparison of the two contract values then allows us to determine whether the buy-out contract should be structured so as to achieve renegotiation by setting r = 1 or not by setting r = r 1 .
We present a comparison of all contracts covered and costly renegotiation in Figure 5 .
Remember that our previous analysis shows that buy-out contracts with renegotiation are equivalent to exclusion contracts with renegotiation. Renegotiation is only optimal when the various eciency losses of the upfront contracts exceed the cost of renegotiation. As marketing and research ineciencies are highest for incremental products with low marketpotential variability, renegotiation is optimal in the top left quadrant of the gure. Whenever renegotiation is too costly, the tradeos between other regions of the gure are the same as in Figure 3 . 
Delayed Contracting
While there may be forces extraneous to our paper such as risk aversion or cash constraints that push the innovator to contract early in the R&D cycle, in the absence of such motives for upfront contracting, the innovator may choose to bide her time and delay contracting with the marketer until his contribution is needed. At this time, the R&D eort has been made and its outcome realized. If contracting is costless and market-potential is observable, the rst-best solution can be trivially obtained. The innovator simply sells the product to the marketer at its market value, yielding the right incentives for both the innovator and the marketer. We now relax these cost and observability conditions in turn.
Costly Contracting
While contracting is often assumed to be costless, we have argued before that this is unlikely to be the case: legal fees or delays in development reduce the value of the R&D project, thus aecting the contract value that can be created. We introduce a xed cost for upfront and delayed contracting, denoted by F 1 and F 2 respectively. To avoid the trivial scenario in which contracting is never optimal, even after the R&D outcome is revealed, we limit
Adding a xed cost to the innovator's optimization problem for upfront contracting does not change her optimal contract choice. The cost F 1 can be deducted from the optimal contract value determined as per our prior analysis. The benets and drawbacks of the dierent contractual choices still apply. However, we also note that upfront contracting costs are incurred regardless of whether the project turns out to be successful or not. When the innovator delays contracting, she incurs a xed cost F 2 , and, given that market-potential is observable, the project is sold for a xed price equivalent to its market value. The innovator's optimization problem becomes:
From the point of view of eciency, we observe two opposing forces. On the upside, delayed contracting avoids royalties thereby ensuring optimal marketing eort from the marketer. On the downside, the innovator's R&D eort is distorted due to the future contracting cost F 2 and an inecient launch decision may be taken if the cost of contracting is too high to justify selling to the marketer in the low market-potential outcome
and the innovator takes the project forward herself. The optimal R&D eort and contract value are summarized below.
Proposition 4 If the innovator chooses to delay contracting, the optimal R&D eort and contract value are given by the expressions below whenever
, the optimal R&D eort and contract value are:
The choice between upfront or delayed contracting needs to balance the benets and costs of the dierent timing options. We can see from Figure 6 that either delayed contracting or one of the previously discussed milestone or option contracts may be optimal. Similar to the discussion about renegotiation, delayed contracting is optimal whenever the research and marketing ineciencies of upfront contracting are high, i.e., in the top left quadrant.
Intuitively, the region where delayed contracting is optimal will expand or shrink depending on the relative cost of upfront vs. delayed contracting. 
As previously discussed, delayed contracting can achieve rst-best if contracting is costless and market-potential is observable. Having analyzed the impact of relaxing the rst of these conditions, we now relax the observability assumption.
The innovator observes failure versus success at the end of the research phase but marketpotential is only observable to the marketer. This leads to a principal-agent problem at t = 4 where the principal (innovator) knows the probabilities of the possible outcomes, while the agent (marketer) knows the outcome. We adopt the terminology of adverse selection problems and label the marketer facing a high (low) market-potential outcome as the H-type (L-type). Our setup is a variation from the typical principal-agent model where probabilities for types are exogenous; they are endogenous in our case. The innovator solves the following optimization problem and selects contract parameters, as a function of her eort. The incentive compatibility constraints (ICH and ICL) ensure that each type of marketer prefers the contract intended for his own type while the individual rationality constraints (IRH and IRL) ensure that both types participate.
Proposition 5 It is optimal for the innovator to oer a menu of two contracts. One intended for the H-type marketer with
and another intended for the L-type marketer with
The L-type marketer receives a contract with milestones and royalties that transfers all value created from the partnership to the innovator. Intuitively, royalties cause a larger distortion for the H-type marketer who enjoys a more valuable product. The innovator designs a contract with higher milestones l H > l L for the H-type marketer and zero royalties.
While the lower milestone is attractive to the H-type marketer, the value destroyed by royalties is much higher for the H-type marketer than the L-type, thereby discouraging him from choosing the contract intended for the L-type. This allows for separation of the two types. The H-type marketer enjoys an information advantage and makes a positive prot.
Theorem 6 Under unobservable market-potential, an upfront full contract with a buy-out option outperforms both delayed contracting and an upfront buy-out option without an upfront payment.
While the information advantage of the marketer can be partially addressed by a menu of contracts when delayed contracting leads to unobservable market-potential, the marketer would still retain some information rents. Theorem 6 shows that a full contract, which uses all three payment terms (s, l, r), signed upfront when neither party has superior information allows the innovator not to give information rents. To see this, rst note that the menu of contracts described in Proposition 5 can be replicated by a single buy-out contract with
, the payment of which relieves the marketer of the obligation to pay royalties. Second, the positive rents enjoyed by the H-type can be extracted by an upfront signature fee s > 0, at time t=1, that does not interfere with incentive compatibility or product launch decisions, at time t=4 where the signature fee is a sunk cost for the marketer.
Robustness
Given the centrality of the parameter γ to our model, we test the robustness of our results to an alternate model specication in which the innovator can invest in two dierent types of research eorts: research eort e P enhances the probability of technical success whereas research eort e Q increases the probability of a high market-potential given technical success.
We list the necessary notation changes in Table 3 . All variables not mentioned in the table are as per the original model. Similar to our original model, we make the following assumptions:
the probabilities are linear in research eort, π(e P ) = p + e P for the probability of technical success and κ(e Q ) = q + e Q for the probability of high market-potential given technical success; and the cost of both research eorts is quadratic in eort, i.e. c P e 2 P /2 and c Q e 2 Q /2, respectively.
Decisions Parameters e P Research eort to increase p Base probability of technical success probability of technical success c P Cost factor of research eort e P e Q Research eort to increase q Base probability of high market-potential probability of high market-potential c Q Cost factor of research eort e Q When marketing eort is undertaken by the marketer, the project value is:
A project for which c P is high compared to c Q corresponds to a incremental project:
improvements aiming to reach higher market-potential are easier to make, but the probability of technical success is dicult to increase. This corresponds to γ < 0 in the original model.
Conversely, c P could be relatively low compared to c Q : this maps to novel projects, where it is easier to work on ensuring that the project will be technically successful rather than working toward the high market-potential outcome. By varying the cost of increasing the probability of a high market-potential outcome, c Q , while keeping the cost of investing in enhancing the technical probability of success, c P , constant, we span the spectrum of R&D process types from incremental to novel. We analyze the same contract structures and payment terms for upfront contracting as for our previous model and plot the results in Figure 7 .
Figure 7: Optimality of Upfront Contracts
Comparing Figures 3 and 7 , we observe that our qualitative insights are robust to the model specications as the same contract types are optimal for similar combinations of project parameters. An exclusion contract is optimal for large dierences between low and high market-potential outcomes. As an exclusion contract provides strong incentives for reaching the high market-potential outcome, it is less likely to be the optimal contract choice when the cost of increasing the probability of a high market-potential outcome is high. In contrast, the milestone contract with innovator launch control provides a strong incentive for enhancing the technical probability of success. Hence, it is more likely to be optimal when the cost of increasing the probability of a high market-potential outcome is high or when there is low market-potential variability, as this makes the market-potential outcome less relevant. The buy-out contract is optimal for the remaining combinations of project parameters, i.e., when the contract should induce some market-potential enhancing eort, but the low market-potential outcome is still valuable enough that it should be marketed by the more ecient party, the marketer.
8 Conclusion R&D projects and partnerships are dicult to manage due to inherent uncertainties with respect to both successful product launch and market value after commercialization. Two parties may bring dierent capabilities to the partnership, which improves the value that can be attained. At the same time, the inclusion of a second party raises incentive alignment concerns and leads to various ineciencies. Any contract that governs the relationship between the two parties should be designed to obtain the appropriate amount of eort from both and align incentives.
In this paper, we study how control rights, options and timing can be used, in conjunction with various payment terms, to address the ineciencies that may occur when innovators and marketers form partnerships to develop and market new products. We nd that the key factors driving the optimal structure and timing decision depends on the type of R&D process and the variability in market potential outcomes. Our analysis leads to several managerial implications.
Much of the licensing literature has focused on the optimization of various payment terms within a given contract structure. We nd that it is important for parties contemplating an alliance to consider contracting options holistically because clauses allocating launch control or options to either party and contract timing all have an impact on the eectiveness of different payment terms. Our analysis shows that the joint optimization of contract structure and payment terms leads to various contract structures being optimal under dierent R&D project characteristics. Furthermore, our investigation into the timing of the contracting decision in the presence of negotiation costs highlight that either upfront or delayed contracting may be optimal. This shows that optimizing only payment terms is suboptimal and the simultaneous optimization of contract structure, timing, and payment terms is key for improving the value attained from R&D partnerships. We identify two forces that drive contracting choices: (a) whether the innovation process is novel or incremental and (b) variability in market-potential outcomes. In Figure 8 , we provide a map for managers entering R&D partnerships, which guides contract choice based on these factors. The mapping exploits the interaction of the contract terms with those two factors to manage three distinct eciency losses resulting from suboptimal R&D eort, marketing eort, or launch allocation. The R&D process type aects the ability of the dierent payment terms to achieve ecient R&D eort, while variability in market-potential aects the magnitude of the two other eciency losses. Thus, incremental products with high variability in market-potential outcomes are best assigned to exclusion contracts, which limit distortion to marketing and R&D eorts and suer a comparatively mild loss due to innovator launch in the low market-potential outcome. For novel innovations with low market-potential variability, innovator launch control does not distort the marketing eort and achieves marketer launch with only a slight distortion of R&D eort. Novel innovations with high market-potential variability require payment terms that are more responsive to the market outcome, thus favoring buy-out contracts or exclusion contracts. Finally, incremental products with low variability may be best served by delaying contracting or by renegotiating an upfront contract to avoid costly marketing eort or launch allocation distortions.
This study further allows us to highlight an interesting result: the innovator may actually be better o curtailing her rights and granting them to the marketer. First, in an exclusion contract, the launch control right is transferred to the marketer to create a credible commitment to not claiming a reward (milestone) under the low market-potential outcome, creating an incentive to exert higher R&D eort and achieve the high market-potential outcome.
Second, in a buy-out contract, the innovator allows the marketer to buy her out whenever the project achieves high market-potential. Similarly, this buy-out payment creates the necessary incentives for the innovator to exert more eort to reach the high market-potential outcome. While the benets of holding an option are well understood, this shows that giving away an option can also be valuable.
Our work and its insights are timely as evidenced by the growing importance of R&D partnerships (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn 2006) and the common practice of including control rights and options in R&D contracts, as illustrated by the industry examples of Section 1. By modeling a combination of contract payments, the allocation of control rights and options, and timing decisions, our work yields valuable insights into the timing and structure of R&D contracts and opens avenues for further empirical work.
the problem.
Formulating the Lagrangian of the optimization problem described by Equations (5)- (8) and substituting the research and marketing eort levels gives us:
). This contract achieves the socially optimal value. Case 2. λ 1 = 0, λ 2 > 0. This implies a contract with upfront payment s only (l = 0).
Solving the system, we nd that
. This is negative except when γ = −1. Impossible.
Case 3. λ 1 > 0, λ 2 = 0. This case occurs when p L > 0 and implies a contract with a milestone payment l only (s = 0). This yields the following optimal contract terms (s, l) = (0,
). This contract does not achieve the socially optimal value. Case 4. λ 1 > 0, λ 2 > 0. This implies that (s, l) = (0, 0). No contract is written.
Proof of Theorem 2.
For both milestone contracts with marketer launch control, the milestone payment and the corresponding contract value are trivial to determine.
If both outcomes are to be launched by the marketer, the milestone payment will be l = 
Let us compare Ω 1 and Ω 2 :
The RHS of this expression is constant in γ whereas the LHS of this expression is decreasing in γ. We can nd an interior solutionγ ∈ [−1, 1] such that for all γ ≥γ,
, in which case an exclusion contract is never optimal or (2)
, in which case an exclusion contract is always optimal.
Proof of Theorem 3 
and the region over which Ω 2 ≥ Ω 3 is non-empty.
Proof of Proposition 1
In the optimization problem given by equations (15)- (18) we use the constraints to substitute three variables as a function of r as follows: (a) the marketing eort µ iM (Equation (16)); (b) the research eort e (Equation (17)) and (c) the upfront payment s (Equation (18)).
Note that the last substitution is legitimate because the resulting upfront payment will always be non-negative: any royalty rate r ≤ 1 leaves the marketer with a non-negative prot in both market-potential outcomes and the upfront payment is the expected value of the marketer's prot after royalty payments leaving the marketer with zero surplus.
This gives us an unconstrained optimization problem with one decision variable, r:
Then, the solution to the rst-order condition of that problem is:
It can be veried that on the interval [r * , 1] the rst-order condition is non-positive. The second-order condition is negative at r * .
Substituting p L = 0 gives r * = 1/3. The derivative of r * w.r.t. p L is negative and the optimal royalty rate is decreasing in p L . The second equation line shows that r * never exceeds 1/3.
Proof of Theorem 4
A buy-out contract with royalty rate r = 100% and buy-out price B =
to an exclusion contract, and a buy-out contract with royalty rate set to the optimal royalty rate of the royalty contract with a buy-out price in excess of r(2−r)α 2 H 2 is equivalent to the optimal royalty contract. Thus, the optimal buy-out contract will perform at least as well as the best of both.
Take Ω 1 and Ω 2 as the innovator's objective function without and with buy-out option.
(We substitute the marketing eort, research eort and upfront payment as a function of r in Ω 2 as described in the proof of Proposition 1 thus obtaining an unconstrained optimization problem.)
The dierence is positive for r ≤
. Write the optimal royalty rate without buy-out option r 1 . By Proposition 1, we know that r 1 ≤ 1/3 and at r 1 , ∂Ω 1 ∂r = 0. We also show that:
As the rst order derivative of Ω 2 is positive at r 1 , the optimal royalty rate with buy-out option, r 2 , is larger than r 1 .
Proof of Theorem 5
The innovator can set the buy-out option strike price to either B 1 = 
Proof of Proposition 3
The condition on renegotiation F ≤ 
Proof of Proposition 4
The innovator's contract optimization problem is split into the case in which contracting under low market-potential is protable, or F 2 ≤ α 2 L /2(1/k M −1/k I ), and otherwise. In both cases, the optimization follows the same lines as the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 5
Following the solution procedure common for adverse selection problems we cover the interesting case where ICH and IRL bind (Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) ), which leads to a separating equilibrium. None of the other cases lead to separating equilibria. We can solve the two binding constraints for the contract parameters l H and l L . This gives us
We ignore the constraint ICL for the moment and check that it is satised at the end. Substituting expressions for l H and l L into the objective function and dierentiating with respect to r H gives ∂Ω(e,r L ,r H )
Since π H (e) and k M are positive, and reducing r H relaxes IRH, the only remaining constraint that is aected is r H ≥ 0. We can therefore set r H = 0. Substituting r H = 0 into the expression for l H gives
Substituting the expressions for other contract parameters into the objective function, differentiating the objective function w.r.t. r L and solving the FOC for r L we get
Since α H > α L > 0 and π L (e), π H (e) ≥ 0 with at least one probability strictly greater than zero, the expression for r L is always nonnegative. Substituting the above expressions for contract parameters into the ignored constraint ICL reveals that it is satised. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6
If the innovator were to oer a menu of contracts at t=1 the ICH and ICL constraints would remain the same as in Proposition 5 as they need to be satised at time t=4. We denote them as ICH 4 and ICL 4 . Similarly, we need constraints that ensure the product is launched at time t=4, when the signature fee s is sunk, and denote them by IRL 4 and IRH 4 .
We also need a constraint IR 1 that makes sure that the marketer wants to participate at time t=1. This gives us the optimization problem below.
( Finally, as IR 1 is not binding in the above solution, increasing s by a small increment h > 0 clearly improves the maximand without aecting the rst four constraints and still satisfying IR 1 . The innovator can continue increasing s and improving the maximand until IR 1 binds.
This shows that an upfront full contract with a buy-out option always outperforms both delayed contracting with unobservable market-potential and an upfront buy out option without an upfront payment. This completes the proof.
